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The role of seniority in the Congresses of the twentieth century has been well documented by
congressional scholars and political observers alike. For most of that century seniority was akin
to power. However, over the course of the last twenty-five years we have observed the weakening
of the institution of seniority. One area where this weakening is especially apparent is in the
selection of committee chairs. Historically committee chairs were selected on the basis of their
seniority. Following the Republican takeover of the House in 1994, party leadership began assigning
committee chairs to committee members who demonstrated loyalty to the party. Drawing on
elections literature that finds linkages between the partisan loyalty of a member and a decrease
in electoral success I evaluate whether a loyalty-based selection system puts committee chairs at
an electoral disadvantage. My results demonstrate that institutional changes designed to induce
party loyalty in committee chairs can have adverse effects on the electoral vote share of said chairs.
However, I fail to find evidence that committee chairs selected under a loyalty-based selection system
do any worse electorally relative to rank-and-file members in similar districts.
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INTRODUCTION
Going into the 2018 midterm elections, Republican members of Congress were faced with the
toughest election they had encountered since the red wave swept the country in 2010. An unusually
polarizing and unpopular Republican president set the stage for Democrats to make big gains in the
House of Representatives. Of those members facing a difficult re-election bid were a group of five
committee chairmen. This represented roughly a quarter of all sitting committee chairs. Rather
than face re-election, three of those committee chairmen chose instead to retire, two of those three
were also at the end of their three term limit. In total Democrats picked up three of those districts,
including the seat held by the chairman of the Rules Committee, Pete Sessions, who had decided
not to retire.
How is it that the chair of one of the most prestigious committees in Congress could fail to
win re-election? The chair of a committee such as the House Committee on Rules wields power
that, in theory, should give them every opportunity to stave off a challenger and win the votes of
their constituents. I will argue that this is the result of the method that Republican leadership has
chosen to use in the allocation of committee chairs.
The textbook congresses of the mid-twentieth century were characterized by powerful and mostly
autonomous committee chairs chosen purely on the basis of their seniority within the committee.
These chairmen possessed autocratic levels of power over their domains. They were able to act
completely independently of the wishes of party leadership and use their power to the fullest extent.
It was not until the 1970’s that the caucus was able to institute some level of oversight over the
chairs, and even then removal of the chair was only used in the most severe cases (Lawrence, 2018).
Following the rise to power of the Republicans in the 104th Congress, the seniority system
of nominating committee chairs was abandoned. In place of seniority came the GOP Steering
Committee. The Steering Committee consists of party leaders, as well as a selection of other
members chosen for regional and seniority reasons (Leighton and Lopez, 2002). Barring a brief
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hiatus in the 109th and 110th Congresses, the GOP Steering Committee has been the primary
committee chair selection mechanism for Congress from 1995 to present day.
While seniority still plays some role in the nomination decisions of Republican leadership, their
modus operandi has been to place the most weight on party loyalty and party donations (Deering
and Wahlbeck, 2006; Cann, 2008). One of the side-effects of the seniority system was that because
the members who had seniority came from districts that were incredibly safe, committee chairs
selected due to seniority tended to come from safe districts (Becker and Moscardelli, 2008). Given
that Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) and Carson et al. (2010) show that increased party support negatively
affects electoral success it could be that by violating the seniority norm in favor of loyalty party
leadership is placing the committee chairs, who per Becker and Moscardelli (2008) have lower vote
shares than those selected under a system of seniority, in a tough electoral position. In this paper
I propose a theory whereby committee chairs selected under a loyalty based selection system are
punished electorally relative to members who are situated in similar districts, and also relative to
those committee chairs appointed under a seniority system. Significant results here would work
towards a broader question of why members seek to become committee chairs given that Volden
and Wiseman (2017) find that committee chairs are less effective now than ever before.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Electoral Effects of Partisan Voting
The basis for my theory lies in a few distinct, but related areas of study. Starting with the
literature on how roll call votes affect electoral outcomes of members of Congress, it is important
to note that this work comes in two forms. The first group of articles attempt to answer the
question of whether or not individual roll call votes can change an incumbents vote share, while
the second group strives to discover the effects of repeated partisan voting over the course of any
given congressional term. While the two areas are related, it is necessary to understand both the
micro and macro effects of legislative accountability to bridge the gap between committee chairs
and electoral margins.
Observing electoral penalties on individual votes shows that under certain circumstances members
are punished for a singular vote. A clear example of this is the Affordable Care Act of 2010, where
members of the Democratic party who voted for the bill were viewed as out of step with their
constituency. The punishment was severe enough that it could be the reason the Democrats lost
control of the House the following midterm (Nyhan et al., 2012). What was it about that one vote
that made it so cataclysmic to those members who voted for it? Bovitz and Carson (2006) provide
a compelling explanation where the electoral effect of any particular vote can be at least partially
explained by how salient a vote is, as well as how controversial and divisive among the majority
party that vote is.
If members can be held accountable for an individual vote then it is reasonable to think that
they are held accountable for the entirety of their voting record as well. The literature shows
that voters do punish their members of Congress for their voting record. Specifically they punish
members for partisan voting behavior. Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) find that not only does increased
party line voting hurt the vote share of members of Congress during an election, but that it is a
substantial enough effect that it lowers the probability of re-election. While Canes-Wrone et al.
(2002) only study the effect of partisan voting, Carson et al. (2010) go a step further and argue
3
that it is not ideology that is punished by voters, but the perceived partisanship that comes with
party line voting. With that being said, according to Hollibaugh et al. (2013), the incumbency
advantages still matter and the electoral penalty faced by members of Congress for partisan voting
behavior is dependent on a challenger who is better representative of the district. While this effect
is conditioned on what kind of challenger an incumbent faces, the evidence suggests there is a
significantly negative effect on incumbents vote share for supporting their party.
Parties and Committees
There must be a reason that members of Congress would observe party loyalty even though it is
electorally costly, because we see it time and time again. The literature here offers no shortage of
explanations. Of specific interest here is the research done on the use of committee assignments and
committee chair positions to induce loyalty in members.
In terms of general committee assignments, Leighton and Lopez (2002) find that party loyalty
matters when it comes to who gets assigned to what committee. Members with higher loyalty get
assigned to more valuable committees as measured by scores derived by Groseclose and Stewart III
(1998). This effect is dependent on the conditions of Conditional Party Government being met
(Kanthak, 2004; Rohde, 1994). Not only do members with higher loyalty get better assignments,
those who face a higher electoral penalty for party loyalty are rewarded even more by the Steering
Committee for said loyalty (Leighton and Lopez, 2002). Deering and Smith (1997) push back
on these points however, as they claim that the Steering Committees try to give members their
preferred assignments. With that said, there are certainly some committees that will be harder to
secure a spot on, and in those cases the party rewards loyalty.
Since party loyalty is important to the Steering Committee in regards to the value of the
committee that rank-and-file members are assigned to, it stands to reason that this is a pattern
we should see repeated in the allocation of the committee chair seats. What we observe is that
seniority has indeed been replaced as the primary determinant within the Republican party, and
instead the two main factors that best predict whether a member gets a committee chair are party
unity on roll call votes and money donated to the party (Deering and Wahlbeck, 2006; Cann, 2008).
While seniority still plays a role, that role seems relegated to that of a foot in the door. Deering and
Wahlbeck (2006) find that seniority insures an interview with the steering committee but not the
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position. Another harder to quantify criteria is posited by Deering and Smith (1997) who claim that
committee chairs in the 104th Congress were also selected on the basis of the energy they would
bring to the job. An interesting caveat within this literature is that seniority still is the deciding
factor on constituency-oriented committees (Deering and Smith, 1997).
Members of the Republican party must exhibit party loyalty in the form of money and roll
call votes in order to get the position of committee chair, but do they show that same loyalty once
appointed or do they use the opportunity to pursue their own policy goals? The literature on this
question suggests that members continue to exhibit party loyalty for institutional reasons. Even
before the rise of the era of higher partisanship of the 1980’s (Lee, 2016), committee chairs began to
vote more in line with the party median following the committee reforms of the 1970’s which gave
the party caucus more control over the approval of committee chairs (Wright, 2000). This suggests
that the institutional rules related to the selection of committee chairs can induce loyalty in the
behavior of those chairs.
While the changing of rules had an effect on the behavior of committee chairs, increased partisan
pressure has had an effect as well. For instance, in the 104th Congress, the Republican leadership
did not just monitor committee progress and behavior on legislation but “intervened aggressively” on
legislation that was important to the Republican party (Deering and Smith, 1997). The behavior of
party leadership is conditioned on the type of messaging surrounding the legislation, with legislation
that is a minority party priority receiving the most intrusive action from the majority party (Evans,
2001). However, while these issues that are classified as minority party priories, or issues that make
the minority (majority) party look good (bad), received the most attention from leadership it is still
the case the party leadership plays a more involved role in all parts of the committee process now
than previously (Evans, 2001).
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The complete autonomy of committee chairs ended around the 94th Congress. At this time,
Democratic caucus members moved to make the approval of committee chairs through secret ballot
the norm. This was due to frustration among caucus members with respect to the phenomenon
of Southern Democrats who did not represent the party holding inordinate amounts of power as
committee chairs. The end result was that three Southern Democrat committee chairs were removed
from their positions due to their lack of willingness to vote with the party (Lawrence, 2018). These
were particularly egregious cases and the power to override the seniority system was used incredibly
sparingly for the rest of the era of Democratic dominance in the House. For what amounted to a
fairly small check on committee power relative to the reforms enacted by Republicans in the 1990’s,
the effects were substantial. Wright (2000) finds that, following reform, committee chairs voted
more in line with the median member of the party than had previously been the case. Given that
partisan voting is punished at the ballot box by voters (Canes-Wrone et al., 2002; Carson et al.,
2010), I predict that this change in behavior by committee chairs will correspond with a decrease in
their vote share.
 Hypothesis 1: Committee chairs will receive lower vote shares post 1970’s committee reform.
Support for Hypothesis 1 would demonstrate that even relatively mild institutional restraints
placed on committee chairs in an era before the rise of partisanship will induce behavior that is
electorally detrimental. With the switch to a loyalty based system in 1994, the Republicans placed
constraints on their chairs that was far more restrictive than that of their Democratic counterparts.
The Republican leadership expected loyalty from their committee chairs, and they went about doing
this in a number of ways.
For Republican leadership seniority isn’t completely ignored, only mostly ignored. According
to Deering and Wahlbeck (2006), seniority gets a member their foot in the door. Members with
seniority are often interviewed by the Republican Steering Committee. However, once interviewed,
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seniority plays no more role in the process. They find that the decision is made based on a members
party loyalty and financial contributions.
In addition to their reliance on members who are more loyal, Republican party leadership plays
a more active role in inserting themselves into the committee process than the Democrats had
previously (Deering and Smith, 1997; Evans, 2001). Specifically, party leadership intervenes most
on issues that are minority party messaging points, which are issues that make the minority party
look good, the majority party look bad, or both (Evans, 2001). Notice that these issues are the
same kind that Bovitz and Carson (2006) might expect to be electorally costly.
Finally, overt threats by leadership became more common. One such quote from former whip
and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert states, “The chairs will deliver on the leadership’s agenda,
because they know that if they fail, they won’t be chairs anymore.” These kind of threats combined
with the tendency to remove under-performing chairs represents a threat to chairs that is far more
credible than any the Democrats ever offered up to their own chairs.
Given these stricter constraints by the party, we should see a similar, but more extreme
phenomena than the one seen in the post-reform era. However, it could be that the electoral
punishment is already built in given that members are selected on the basis of loyalty. I do not
think that this is the case. For this to be true, chairs would have to be perfectly loyal already or
the party leadership would have to be content with the current behavior of a soon to be appointed
chair. The mere fact that Republican leadership constrains their chairs in the way that they do
signals that they are not content with the loyalty of the committee chairs.
If we think of members as single-minded seekers of re-election (Mayhew, 1974), then we would
expect that members would take votes they believed to be most advantageous given that individual
votes can have a negative effect on electoral outcomes (Nyhan et al., 2012; Bovitz and Carson, 2006).
Since the party leadership takes a much more active role in the committee process (Deering and
Smith, 1997; Evans, 2001), and actively constrains chairs, even more so than Democrats, we can
conclude that leadership is making chairs do things that they do not necessarily want to do. This
provides evidence that even chairs selected on the basis of loyalty are not perfectly loyal to the
party line upon selection or else these actions would not be necessary. As such, I expect that chairs
should become more loyal upon appointment and be appropriately punished by the electorate.
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 Hypothesis 2A: Committee chairs under a loyalty-selection system should show higher
loyalty than representatives in similar districts who are not chairs.
 Hypothesis 2B: Committee chairs under a loyalty-selection system should show a decreased
vote share relative to representatives in similar districts.
What does a decreased vote share mean? Potentially nothing if the members that are selected
as committee chairs due to loyalty are more loyal because they are in a safe district. In what is a
simple test yet illustrative test, Becker and Moscardelli (2008) find that the average two party vote
share in 2004 for members who would go on to be Democratic chairs in 2007 was 75%. In contrast
the average two party vote share of the Republicans who would become committee chairs in 2005
was 68.7%. They theorize that this is because members with seniority are by definition the safest
members as these are members who repeatedly win re-election. If members under a loyalty system
are less electorally secure then they should be less equipped to handle an electoral penalty, such as
we saw with Pete Sessions.
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DATA AND METHODS
To analyze the effect that being a committee chair has on party loyalty and electoral outcomes,
I compiled a dataset from four separate sources. For committee membership data I used data
from Nelson (2010) as well as data collected by Charles Stewart for the more recent Congresses
(Stewart III, 2012). Together these data sets contain committee membership, committee seniority, a
members position on a committee, and member information for all members of Congress between
the 80th and present day. To assess the effects of membership in the treatment group I utilize data
from Lewis et al. (2018). Finally to assess electoral effects I utilize election data from Gary Jacobson
(Jacobson, 2015). This data contains election results by district for both the district level race and
the presidential race in that district. It also has information on the quality of the challenger as well
as Democratic and Republican expenditures.
To evaluate my first hypothesis that committee chairs do worse electorally following reform in
the 94th Congress I use an OLS regression. I limit my data to Democrats from the 86th Congress
through the 102nd Congress. I chose those years because I think they best encapsulate the textbook
Congress era as that spans from 1959-1993. I omit the 103rd Congress given that the election
following said Congress saw the Democrats lose the chamber, and I believe that this bad showing by
the Democrats overall may bias towards a positive finding. The dependent variable in this analysis
is the percent of the two-party vote share each member received in the election following their
participation in a given Congress. The main independent variable is an interaction between two
dummy variables. The first is a variable that is coded 1 if the election takes place after the 94th
Congress and 0 otherwise. The second is a variable that is coded as 1 if the member is a committee
chair and 0 otherwise.
I also included a few control variables in my analysis of my first hypothesis. There is an adjusted
measure of presidential performance in each district. This measure is the difference between the
Democratic presidential candidates district level performance and their national performance. It is
coded so that a positive number indicates a president outperformed their national vote share in
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that district. This is to account for the varying quality of presidential candidates. Also included are
a measure of challenger quality which is a dummy variable indicating whether a candidate has held
previous elected office, a dummy variable for southern states, a variable indicating whether there is
an incumbent running, and finally a variable indicating if the chair retired after that session.
The test of both parts of my second hypotheses are identical in every way except for the
dependent variable. The data used here is all Republicans from the 104th Congress to the 113th
Congress with the exception of the 110th and 111th Democratically controlled Congresses. The
dependent variable for the first part of my second hypothesis is the z-score of a members party
unity score. I use the z-score instead of just the party unity because high within party homogeneity
makes it difficult to differentiate between the base party unity scores. The dependent variable for
the second part of my second hypothesis is a members two-party Republican vote share.
The second hypothesis is also tested using an OLS regression, however the data are pre-processed
by first being passed through a matching algorithm to match chairs and non-chairs from similar
districts. Matching was done using the MatchIt package in R created by Kosuke Imai. The method
used for matching was nearest neighbor matching with sub-classification to account for different time
variation. I matched only on district characteristics such as adjusted vote share of the Democratic
presidential candidate, whether an incumbent occupied the seat, the existence of a quality challenger,
whether the district was redistricted since last election, Republican campaign expenditures, and
whether there was a challenger in the previous election. I do not match on individual member
characteristics such as seniority. I elected to do it this way for theoretical reasons, mainly that the
theory and hypothesis deal with loyalty and vote share in relation to members in similar districts, not
members who are themselves similar. After matching on the aforementioned district characteristics,
I run a model where I include a control for a member’s seniority on their committee and also a
control variable denoting if a committee chair retired after that Congress. The primary independent
variable for both of these models is a three level factor variable denoting not only chair status
but also committee type. I divide committee chairs into two categories: chairs of constituency
committees and chairs of all other committees. I am using constituency committees as defined by
Deering and Smith (1997). These are committees that could potentially benefit the chair electorally





The results for the analysis on hypothesis 1 are in table 1. I find support for my hypothesis
that committee chairs receive lower vote shares post 1970’s committee reform than they did before.
I find significant and negative effects on the vote share of committee chairs post-reform. The effect
is large enough that it eliminates any electoral benefit that comes from holding that position. Prior
to committee reform the chairs could expect to have about a 3% higher vote share than non chairs.
Following reform this electoral benefit ceases to exist. Figure 1 shows the predicted vote share
of chairs and non-chairs pre and post reform with 95% confidence intervals. Here we have strong
evidence that a relatively small institutional change designed to instill loyalty in the committee
chairs succeeded, and as a result hurt the electoral prospects of the chairs.
The implications of this finding alone are noteworthy. Here we have clear evidence that when
holding district factors constant, committee chairs in the pre-1974 era had a clear electoral advantage
over rank-and-file members. Following the rule changes in the early 70’s where the autonomy of the
chairs was limited by the Democratic caucus we see not just a reduction, but the complete elimination
of any kind of electoral benefit. This doesn’t appear to be a case of lower vote share in elections for
all Democrats either as there is no change in the predicted vote share for non-chairs. Instead, we
have evidence that rule changes within Congress can have very real electoral consequences for the
members whom they effect. Further, given that a result of the committee reforms of the 1970’s was
to increase committee chair loyalty (Wright, 2000), this finding lends support to previous work such
as Canes-Wrone et al. (2002) and Carson et al. (2010) who find that members of Congress face an
electoral penalty for party loyalty.
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Predicted Vote Share For Democrats
Note: Predicted percentage of the two-party vote for members of the Democratic party between the 86th and
102nd Congresses. Pre-reform is defined as pre-1974 and post-reform is post-1974. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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Residual Std. Error 8.930 (df = 4461)
F Statistic 338.659∗ (df = 8; 4461)
Note: Coefficients are obtained using ordinary least squares regression.
DV is the percent of the two-party vote that a candidate received.





I find mixed support for hypothesis 2A which says that committee chairs under a loyalty-selection
system will show higher loyalty than representatives in similar districts who are not chairs. The
results of the regression which was run after matching are presented in table 2, and a visualization
of the results is available in figure 2. What I find is that after matching on district characteristics,
committee chairs that represent committees that are not focused on constituency service do exhibit
higher levels of party unity then the rank-and-file. However, when looking at the committee chairs
who represent committees that have a focus on serving a members constituency the same effect is
not found.
The reason for the difference in loyalty between committee chairs who serve on constituency
committees and those who serve on all other committees could be due to the difference in the types
of issues that the different committees deal with. It could also be a question of party pressure. It is
possible that party leadership might take a more active role in legislation coming out of Ways and
Means or Financial Services as opposed to Veterans Affairs. One last thing to note is that while
this test shows that a subset of committee chairs exhibit greater loyalty than the rank-and-file, I
cannot make a claim about whether these members became more loyal after becoming a committee
chair or if they were selected specifically because they are more loyal.
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Residual Std. Error 0.540 (df = 121)
F Statistic 2.322 (df = 4; 121)
Note: Coefficients are the result of ordinary least squares regression
run after matching on district characteristics. The dependent variable
variable is a member’s party unity score scaled within each Congress.
∗p<0.05
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Predicted Republican Party Unity (Scaled)
Note: Predicted party unity z score for members of the Republican party between the 104th and 113th
Congresses with the exception of the 110th and 111th. Committee types are split using definitions provided by
Deering and Smith (1997). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Hypothesis 2B
Hypothesis 2B says that committee chairs under a loyalty-selection system should show a
decreased vote share relative to representatives in similar districts. I find no support for this
hypothesis. In fact, figure 3 suggests there is some evidence that chairs of constituency committees
might get a boost in elections. The results of the regression can be found in table 3. The only
significant result shows that Republicans do worse in districts in which a chair had retired at the
end of the session. This is likely just the result of the race being an open seat and likely more
competitive. Given that the Republican chairs are term limited and more likely to retire at the end
of the term (Reynolds, 2017) this could indicate a rather large downside for Republican leaderships
policy of term limiting their chairs.
In some ways the lack of any effect for non-constituency committee chairs is in and of itself
interesting. Conventional wisdom might say that committee chairs should do better than other
members of Congress located in similar districts because of advantages that come with being a chair.
Instead, I have found that there is no electoral benefit for being a committee chair. The one caveat
to this is that there is suggestive but not significant evidence that chairs representing constituency
oriented committees might do better. When taken in tandem with the findings from earlier that
show committee chairs losing any electoral benefit following the committee reforms of the 1970’s we
get a picture that suggests that chairs are being punished but that this punishment seems to be
balanced out by other benefits that come from being the chair of a committee.
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Residual Std. Error 8.731 (df = 140)
F Statistic 1.140 (df = 3; 140)
Note: Coefficients are the result of ordinary least squares
regression run after matching on district characteristics.
The dependent variable is the percent of the two-party
vote that a member received.
∗p<0.05
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Predicted Vote Share For Republicans
Note: Predicted percentage of the two party vote for members of the Republican party between the 104th
and 113th Congresses with the exception of the 110th and 111th. Committee types are split using definitions
provided by (Deering and Smith, 1997) . Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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DISCUSSION
The results of this analysis have some interesting implications. Significant findings for the first
hypothesis show the erasure of any electoral benefit following the reforms of the 94th Congress. When
taken in conjunction with findings by Wright (2000) that show the increase in loyalty for committee
chairs during this same time period I show evidence in support of findings by Canes-Wrone et al.
(2002) and Carson et al. (2010) that party loyalty is penalized at the ballot box. Additionally, there
is evidence that when compared to members in similar districts committee chairs have higher party
unity.
The lack of significant findings for the final hypothesis is interesting given the results of the
two preceding ones. There are a couple of potential explanations here that might merit further
investigation. It could be due to the fact that committee chairs wield more power than regular
members, and as such they are able to bring extra benefits to their constituents that would mitigate
any loyalty punishment. Alternatively, due to the use of a scaled measure of party unity instead of
just the flat measure to analyze loyalty it could be that the actual substantive differences in loyalty
are too small to elicit any sort of punishment.
Ultimately these results show that the Republican strategy of inducing loyalty in their committee
chairs works quite well, at least as measured here. Their chairs are more loyal than rank and
file Republican members, and are not punished for being so. Whether this strategy translates to
better outcomes for the party would be an interesting thread to pursue in the future as Volden and
Wiseman (2017) show that chairs under Republican term limits are less effective than Democratic
chairs, but at least electorally the chairs are not facing any punishment.
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